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3 Fig. 1. Averaged capital per player as a function of the number of play-
ers obtained using analytical expressions for the evolution of the probability
distribution. The paradox exists only for N = 3 and N = 6.
Fig. 2 Numerically obtained averaged capital per player per turn of the
games as a function of the number of players (10 ≤ N < 1000). Capital is
averaged over 1000 turns and over 1000 runs of the games. The paradox does
not occur for any value of N . .
Fig. 3. Averaged capital per player as a function of the number of players
obtained using analytical expressions for the evolution of the probability distri-
bution. The paradox exists for all values of N , except for N = 4 and then only
in case game A+B is played.
Fig. 4. Numerically obtained averaged capital per player per turn of the
games as a function of the number of players (10 ≤ N < 1000). Capital is
averaged over 1000 turns and over 1000 runs. The paradox occurs for all N .
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Abstract
Inspired by asynchronous cooperative Parrondo’s games we introduce
two new types of games in which all players simultaneously play game A
or game B or a combination of these two games. These two types of games
differ in the way a combination of games A and B is played. In the first
type of synchronous games, all players simultaneously play the same game
(either A or B), while in the second type players simultaneously play the
game of their choice, i.e. A or B. We show that for these games, as in
the case of asynchronous games, occurrence of the paradox depends on the
number of players. An analytical result and an algorithm are derived for
the probability distribution of these games.
Recently, new types of Parrondo’s games have been introduced [1], termed co-
operative Parrondo’s games that incorporate the feedback through spatial neigh-
bor dependence. These games are based on the state of player’s nearest neighbors
where the state refers to a player either being a winner or a loser in the previous
game. Each of N players, arranged in a circle, owns a capital Ci(t), i = 1, . . . , N,
which evolves by combination of two games. Game A is the same as in the clas-
sical setup [2],[3],[4], namely the probability of winning and losing is p(A) and
1−p(A) respectively. Game B depends on the state of neighbors to the left and to
the right of the player, i.e. whether they have won or lost in the previous game.
Games A and B, when played individually may be losing or fair, while any kind
of periodic or random alternation of games A and B turns out to be winning. In
1
[1], the evolution of probabilities in games B and C was studied using mean field
type equations while in [5], referred to as paper 1, we have modeled the games as
discrete-time Markov chains and we have derived the analytic form of the exact
probability evolution equations. Inspired by these games, we introduce here two
new types of cooperative games in which all players play simultaneously either
game A or game B or any combination of these two games and we name these
games “one dimensional synchronous cooperative games” in order to make distinc-
tion between the standard cooperative games which we termed “one dimensional
asynchronous games”. Essentially the difference from the asynchronous case is
that at each turn of the game all players play simultaneously, again depending
on the state of their neighbors, which in turn is the result of the previous game’s
outcome. Moreover, a combination of games A and B may be played in two dis-
tinctive ways. First, players may simultaneously play game A or game B in any
predetermined or random order. We denote this game as A + B. Alternatively,
each player may at each turn of the game chose randomly whether to play game A
or game B, and we denote this game as A∗B. In both cases the paradoxical result
that games A + B or A ∗ B may be winning while each game individually, A or
B, may be losing, occurs and it depends on the number of players. Interestingly,
for the set of probabilities introduced in [1], the paradox appears only for N = 3
and N = 6. We also introduce a set of probabilities for which a counterintuitive
(paradoxical) result appears irrespective of the number of players with the excep-
tion of N = 4 and then only for the game of type I (A + B). As in the case
of asynchronous games we derive the probability transition matrix for games B,
A+B and A ∗B.
As in the case of asynchronous games, the analysis is performed via discrete
time Markov chains (DTMCs) and we first derive the probability transition matrix
for game B. Probabilities of winning in game B depend on the current state of
left and right neighbors, denoted as a pair hk = (sk − 1 sk + 1), and with player
at position k are given by p
(B)
0 when (sk − 1 sk + 1) = (00), p
(B)
1 when (sk − 1
sk + 1) = (01), p
(B)
2 when (sk − 1 sk + 1) = (10) and p
(B)
3 when (sk − 1 sk + 1)
= (11).
Game B
Let the initial state of the ensemble of players be i = (i1, . . . , iN)and the final
f = (f1, . . . , fN). Since at each moment of time all players play simultaneously
and therefore change each individual state, the probability of transition is
T
(B)
fi =
∏N
k=1
w(ik, fk), (1)
where probabilities w depend on whether state fk is 1 (winning) or 0 (losing), and
upon the probability of winning, i.e.
w(ik, fk) =
{
1− p
(B)
ηk , fk = 0
p
(B)
ηk , fk = 1
(2)
and where ηk = (sk−1, sk+1) = (ik−1, ik+1) denotes an ordered pair of k-th
player’s neighbors in the initial state. Writing ri = 1 − pi where i = 0, 1, 2 or 3,
the probability transition matrix T (B) for N = 3 is
T (B)=


r0r0r0 r2r1r0 r1r0r2 r3r1r2 r0r2r1 r2r3r1 r1r2r3 r3r3r3
r0r0p0 r2r1p0 r1r0p2 r3r1p2 r0r2p1 r2r3p1 r1r2p3 r3r3p3
r0p0r0 r2p1r0 r1p0r2 r3p1r2 r0p2r1 r2p3r1 r1p2r3 r3p3r3
r0p0p0 r2p1p0 r1p0p2 r3p1p2 r0p2p1 r2p3p1 r1p2p3 r3p3p3
p0r0r0 p2r1r0 p1r0r2 p3r1r2 p0r2r1 p2r3r1 p1r2r3 p3r3r3
p0r0p0 p2r1p0 p1r0p2 p3r1p2 p0r2p1 p2r3p1 p1r2p3 p3r3p3
p0p0r0 p2p1r0 p1p0r2 p3p1r2 p0p2r1 p2p3r1 p1p2r3 p3p3r3
p0p0p0 p2p1p0 p1p0p2 p3p1p2 p0p2p1 p2p3p1 p1p2p3 p3p3p3


(3)
It may be immediately noticed that this matrix has no zero entries while for the
asynchronous game B it is sparse, i.e. most of its entries are zero.
Game A+B (Type I)
The ensemble of players collectively chooses to play either game A or game B
so that the probability transition matrix is
T (A+B) = γT (A) + (1− γ)T (B), (4)
and γ represents the relative probability of playing game A, where we assume the
value of one half. Matrix T (A) has a very simple structure in the unbiased case
( p(A) = 1/2) when all entries are equal to 1/8. In order to illustrate the above
expression we calculate the probability of transition from state i = (001) to state
f = (011). The transition i → f occurs when all players play either game A or
game B, hence two possibilities are
(001)→ (011)
{
(1− p(A))p(A)p(A) all players play game A i.e. (AAA)
(1− p2)p1p0 all players play game B i.e. (BBB)
(5)
Therefore, the probability of transition from state (001) to (011) is
T
(A+B)
fi = w(001→ 011) = γ[(1− p
(A))p(A)p(A)] + (1− γ)[(1− p2)p1p0]. (6)
Similarly, each entry in the probability transition matrix T (A+B) may be written
as the sum according to expression 4.
Game A*B (Type II)
In this game each player randomly plays either game A or game B, thus
individually contributing “noise” to the ensemble. In order to shed more light on
the transition process we calculate the transition probability from state i = (001)
to state f = (011). There are 2N = 8 possible ways in which three player state
may change from i to f :
(001)→ (011)


(1− p(A))p(A)p(A) (AAA)
(1− p(A))p(A)p0 (AAB)
(1− p(A))p1p
(A) (ABA)
(1− p(A))p1p0 (ABB)
(1− p2)p
(A)p(A) (BAA)
(1− p2)p
(A)p0 (BAB)
(1− p2)p1p
(A) (BBA)
(1− p2)p1p0 (BBB)
(7)
Sequences in the second column represent players’ choices for each possible tran-
sition. The probability of transition is therefore
T
(A+B)
fi = w(001→ 011) =
1
8
[(1− p(A))p(A)p(A) + (1− p(A))p(A)p0 + (8)
(1− p(A))p1p
(A) + (1− p(A))p1p0 + (1− p2)p
(A)p(A) +
(1− p2)p
(A)p0 + (1− p2)p1p
(A) + (1− p2)p1p0
= [1− (
p(A) + p2
2
)](
p(A) + p1
2
)(
p(A) + p0
2
).
Comparing this expression with the corresponding matrix entry for game B, it
may be deduced (and verified by computing probabilities for all transitions) that
the corresponding entries in the probability transition matrix for game A∗B may
be obtained by replacing each pi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) in T
(A+B) with
1
2
(
p(A) + pi
)
.
The equilibrium (stationary) state occurs when the probability distribution re-
mains invariant under the action of T , that is, |pi(t + 1)〉 = T |pi(t〉 = |pi〉, and
this probability distribution is determined by solving (1− T )pi = 0. For game A,
for which there is a probability p for a player to win (alternatively (1−p) to lose),
the stationary distribution is easily obtained by setting p0 = p1 = p2 = p3 = p in
(3) or alternatively by associating to each ensemble state, corresponding proba-
bilities for each player:
pi(A) = [(1−p)3, (1−p)2p, (1−p)2p, (1−p)p2, (1−p)2p, (1−p)p2, (1−p)p2, p3]T (9)
For game B the stationary distribution may be obtained analytically using the
probability distribution matrix (3), however the expression is too long to be pre-
sented here. Instead we give the numerical values for the stationary distributions
assuming Torral’s values, p0 = 1, p1 = p2 = 0.16, p3 = 0.7:
pi
(B)
1 = [.0570.1906.1906.0849.1906.0849.0849.1161]
T (10)
pi
(A+B)
1 = [.0972.1495.1495.1033.1495.1033.1033.1444]
T (11)
pi
(A∗B)
1 = [.1184.1297.1297.1194.1297.1194.1194.1341]
T (12)
Interestingly, comparison of expressions 10 and 12 shows that the stationary prob-
ability for the occurrence of state (000) increases considerably for game A ∗ B,
implying that “noise” from game A has the largest effect on this state when the
games are alternating individually. For the probability values of set II (p0 = 0.05,
p1 = p2 = 0.6, p3 = 0.8) we get
pi
(B)
2 = [.3163.0761.0761.0936.0761.0936.0936.1742]
T
pi
(A+B)
2 = [.1632.1069.1069.1196.1069.1196.1196.1573]
T
pi
(A∗B)
2 = [.1355.1171.1171.1229.1171.1229.12290.1442]
T
We now present analytical and numerical results of the model. First we consider
probability values of set I, namely ( p0 = 1, p1 = p2 = 0.16, p3 = 0.7) and p
(A) =
0.499. For this set the paradox exists only for N = 3 and 6 (irrespective whether
A+B or A ∗B game is played) as presented in Fig. 1. Results presented in this
figure were obtained using analytical expression for the evolution of probability
distribution. Moreover, numerical simulations show (Fig.2), that paradox does
not occur for any other number of players up to 1000. For set II the paradox
exists for all N except for N = 4, and then only if game A + B is played. In all
other cases the paradox exists as may be noticed in Figs 3 and 4.
In conclusion, one dimensional synchronous games, introduced here and based
on Parrondo’s cooperative games exhibit paradoxical outcome characteristic of
classical Parrondo’s games, namely that alternation of two losing games produces
a net gain. The novel feature of these games is that all players play simultane-
ously either game A or game B, as well as a random mixture of these two games
which may be realized in two different ways. Since winning results from the inter-
action between different players, these paradoxical results may be of far-reaching
consequences for games of economic, social and biological importance.
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